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Abstract. Kathmandu Newar (Sino-Tibetan) has an egophoric verb marking system: an egophoric
(or conjunct) verb form co-occurs with first person in declaratives and second person in inter-
rogatives. Egophoric marking is restricted to predicates of intentional action and also interacts
with evidential markers. This paper examines the distribution of egophoric marking in reports of
speech and attitudes, extending to this domain the analysis of egophoric marking as indicating
self-ascription by the epistemic authority for the utterance. This distribution reveals that egophoric
marking of a clause further introduces an implication that the epistemic authority believes the
proposition denoted by the clause.
1 Introduction
In egophoric verb marking systems, a special form of the verb called the egophoric (or conjunct)
form is found in first person statements and second person questions, while the non-egophoric, (or
disjunct) form appears elsewhere. Such a system is found in the Tibeto-Burman language Newar
(Nepal Bhasa) spoken primarily in the Kathmandu Valley. The characteristic interrogative flip
pattern of Newar is illustrated with the past tense forms of the verb meaning ‘go’ shown in Table
1. The egophoric form wan-a bears a special suffix and also neutralizes the perfective/imperfective
distinction found on the non-egophoric forms.
declarative interrogative
1st person wan-a wã: / wan-a
2nd person wã: / wan-a wan-a
3rd person wã: / wan-a wã: / wan-a
Table 1: Finite past forms of Newar ‘to go’. The non-egophoric forms distinguish perfective from
imperfective. The macron indicates vowel quality: a = low central vowel; a = low back vowel.
The egophoric verb form is glossed EGO in the following examples (from Hargreaves 2005, ex.
(51) to (56)):
(1) a. jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a.
drink-PST.EGO
‘I drank a lot.’
1We would like to thank our Newar consultants Rajendra Man Shrestha, Yogendra Rajkarnikar and Daya Shakya;
Elizabeth Coppock, for her helpful feedback on the analysis; and the audience at the Triple A conference for their
comments.
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b. jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-PFV.NON.EGOQ
la.
‘Did I drink a lot?’
(2) a. chã
2.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a.
drink-PFV.NON.EGO
‘You drank a lot.’
b. chã
2.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-PST.EGOQ
la.
‘Did you drink a lot?’
(Glosses below are simplified to EGO and NON.EGO, omitting any indication of the tense/aspect.
All such examples are in the past tense.). EGO marking also interacts with evidentiality, as we shall
see below. In previous work we have sought to specify the semantics of the EGO marker (Harg-
reaves, 2005, in press; Wechsler, in press; Coppock & Wechsler, to appear). This paper continues
that project, focusing now on evidence from the use of EGO in subordinate clauses expressing the
contents of speech and attitude reports.
Following that earlier work, we posit that the EGO morpheme signals that the proposition de-
noted by its clause is the content of an attitude one has about oneself, called a de se attitude or
a self-ascription (Lewis, 1979a). The role of the participant in the utterance context who self-
ascribes that content is called the epistemic authority: roughly the speaker uttering a declarative
and the addressee hearing a question, modulo the systematic effects of evidential markers. When
the EGO morpheme marks a subordinate clause in Newar, we find that the self-ascriber of that
clause’s content must be the reported epistemic authority, and not the root authority. For exam-
ple, in reports of attitudes, coreference with the reported attitude-holder (Ram in (3)) determines
EGO-marking in the subordinate clause:
(3) a. Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
(wã)
3.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
cal-a.
be.aware-PFV.
‘Rami realized (lit. became aware) that hei￿∗j had done enough work.’
b. Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
(wã)
3.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yat-a
do-NON.EGO
dhaka:
COMP
cal-a.
be.aware-PFV.
‘Rami realized (lit. became aware) that he∗i￿j had done enough work.’
With EGO on the subordinate verb, its subject is coreferential with the matrix subject; with NON.EGO
it is not. Interestingly, if the attitude verb in a sentence like (3a) is negated (‘Ram didn’t real-
ize. . . ’), the EGO marking in the subordinate clause disappears, even if the subjects are coreferen-
tial (see Section 3).
Next we review the distribution of Newar EGO marking in main clauses (Section 2) and em-
bedded clauses (Section 3), followed in Section 4 by a summary of formal analysis in Coppock &
Wechsler (to appear). Then we modify the formal analysis to account for new data from clausal
complements (Section 5).
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2 Semantic properties of Newar EGO-marking
As shown above, first person declarative clauses are typically EGO marked. However, when certain
evidential words appear, first person subjects can cooccur with the NON.EGO form of the verb.
(4) jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-NON.EGO
khanisa.
EVID
‘It appears I drank a lot.’
Sentence (4) would be appropriate if the speaker doesn’t remember drinking, perhaps because
heavy drinking wiped away any memory of the event. Without EGO, the evidential source for
the information expressed in the utterance is understood to be indirect or inferential. In contrast,
the EGO form is used, as in (1a), by a speaker who remembers carrying out the action described.
Conversely, evidential marking can also enable an EGO-marked verb to cooccur with a third person
subject, if the individual denoted by the subject is understood as the source of the report:
(5) a. syam-ã
Syam-ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
hã
EVID
‘According to Syami, hei drank a lot.’
b. wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-NON.EGO
hã
EVID
‘It is said that he drank a lot.’
In sentence (5a) with EGO marking, Syam is understood as the source of the report. But in (5b)
without EGO, the source is understood to be hearsay originating from someone other than a partic-
ipant in the event.
Summarizing so far, the subject of an EGO-marked verb is the (epistemic) authority for the
utterance (Hargreaves, in press; Hale, 1980).2 In declarative sentences the authority is typically the
speaker, in which case the subject is in first person. But authority can be deferred in evidentials,
leading to third person uses. In interrogatives, the authority is the addressee of the utterance, so
the subject is in second person.
EGO appears only in descriptions of intentional actions. With a first person subject, the verb
thwan in EGO form indicates intentional kicking, but in NON.EGO form it indicates accidental
bumping:
(6) a. jı˜:
1.ERG
wa-yata
3-DAT
thwan-a.
kick-EGO
‘I kicked him/her [intentionally].’
2Other terms for notions equivalent or closely related to epistemic authority include: commitment holder (Krifka,
2014), informant (Bickel, 2008), epistemic source (Hargreaves 2005), seat of knowledge (Speas & Tenny, 2003),
locutionary actor (Hale, 1980), locutor (Aikhenvald, 2004), and judge (McCready, 2007).
93
© 2018 by Stephen Wechsler and David Hargreaves
Proceedings of TripleA 4, 91-105
Edited by Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock
b. jı˜:
1.ERG
wa-yata
3-DAT
thwan-a.
kick-NON.EGO
‘I bumped against him/her [by accident].’
Inherently non-intentional predicates like thyan- ‘arrive’ and thul- ‘understand’ never take the EGO
form. Still others, like the verb twan- ‘drink’ in example (1) and (2) above, indicate intentional
action by default, hence take EGO form, but this default can be overridden with modification by
macaeka ‘unwittingly’, in which case the NON.EGO form is used.
As noted in the introduction, the EGO morpheme signals the content of a de se attitude held
by the epistemic authority. In other words, the epistemic authority knowingly self-ascribes that
content. This property of EGO marking is best shown with subordinate clause uses. Consider the
following scenario: Syam is looking at a photo from a wild party in which someone is wearing a
lampshade on his head. Syam points at the besotted partier and says to you, ‘That guy drank too
much’; unbeknownst to Syam, it is himself in the picture. This scenario can be reported with the
English sentence (7a), but not with the controlled infinitive in (7b):
(7) a. Syami said that hei drank too much. (need not be de se)
b. #Syami claimed PROi to have drunk too much. (de se only)
The Newar sentence (8) is syntactically like the English (7a), but semantically like (7b):
(8) #Syam-ã
Syam-ERG
wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
dhal-a.
say-PERF
‘Syami said that hei drank too much.’
Like the English control construction, (8) cannot describe the scenario above: the EGO marking
forces the interpretation in which Syam knowingly self-referred.
We take this de se-ness to be a fundamental semantic property of EGO morphology. From this
fundamental property, together with certain general assumptions about conversational pragmatics,
we will derive the restriction to first person in root declaratives (unless deferred using evidentials)
and second person in root interrogatives.
3 Egophoricity in embedded clauses
In the clausal complements of speech and attitude verbs, EGO-marking is determined by the re-
ported authority rather than the root authority for the utterance. In reports of statements, first of
all, coreference with the reported speaker determines EGO-marking in the embedded clause:
(9) a. syam-ã
Syam-ERG
wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
dhal-a.
say-PERF
‘Syami said that hei drank too much.’
b. syam-ã
Syam-ERG
wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-NON.EGO
dhaka:
COMP
dhal-a.
say-PERF
‘Syami said that hej drank too much.’
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The reported speaker is the epistemic authority for the embedded declarative clause.
In reports of questions, coreference with the reported addressee determines EGO-marking in
the embedded clause:
(10) Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
wa-yata
3SG.DAT
[wã:
3SG.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
/
/
yat-a
do-NON.EGO
dhaka]
COMP
nyan-a.
ask-PFV
‘Ram asked himi whether hei￿j (EGO/NON.EGO) did enough work.’
The reported addressee is the epistemic authority for the indirect question.
Finally, in reports of de se attitudes, coreference with the reported attitude-holder determines
EGO-marking in the subordinate clause. This is shown in example (3) above. The reported attitude-
holder is the epistemic authority for the embedded clause.
Summarizing, the subject of an EGO-marked verb in a complement clause must refer to the
reported epistemic authority. Assuming, as we will later, that the authority is a parameter of
the context, then the behavior of EGO-marking in embedded clauses indicates a kind of indexical
shift, where the authority index has shifted to the embedded context. A similar authority shift
has been observed for many evidential systems (Korotkova, 2016). To get a proper understanding
of embedded egophoricity in Newar, we should consider further that negated attitude verbs reject
EGO-complements:
(11) Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
(wã)
3.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
cal-a.
be.aware-PFV
‘Rami became aware (realized) that hei￿∗j had done enough work.’
(12) *Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
(wã)
3.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
ma-ca:.
NEG-aware.IPV
‘Rami wasn’t aware that hei￿j had done enough work.’
In (11) EGO-marking on a verb in the complement clause indicates that the subject of the EGO-
marked verb refers to the reported bearer of the attitude (Ram), as usual. But in (12), where the
attitude verb has been negated, we find that the embedded verb cannot take the EGO form even if
its subject is coreferential with the attitude bearer.
The badness of (12) can be explained as follows. The verb ca- ‘be aware’ is factive, so the
content of the complement clause is presupposed. We posit that when a clause is EGO-marked, its
content includes the information that the authority believed it at reference time. But that directly
conflicts with (12), so the sentence is bad.
We will say that EGO-clauses must be authorized: the authority in the context should believe
the proposition denoted by the clause. We explore some further consequences of that claim below.
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4 Formal analysis
4.1 Overview
To capture the semantics of an attitude de se, Coppock &Wechsler (to appear) posited a perspecti-
val agent parameter as a refinement on semantic content. The content of a statement, for example,
is not a set of worlds but rather a set of world-agent pairs, or centered worlds (Quine, 1969; Lewis,
1979a). EGO-marking on a verb identifies its subject with that agent parameter. When a sentence
is uttered, the authority in the utterance context, whose commitment to the centered world proposi-
tion is at issue, effectively centers those worlds on herself, thus self-identifying as the perspectival
agent. As explained below, the semantic content interacts with the pragmatic theory to predict the
person restrictions on the subjects of declaratives and interrogatives, as well as the exceptions due
to the deferring of the authority by means of evidential words.
In this paper we address EGO-marking in complement clauses. Like Coppock & Wechsler (to
appear) we assume that the Kaplanian context has a parameter for the authority. For EGO-marking
in complements of speech/attitude verbs, the authority parameter shifts to the reported authority.
We further posit that EGO-marking projects a belief by the authority in the centered proposition
denoted by the clause. The latter assumption effectively explicates the notion of authority.
4.2 EGO marks self-ascribed content
Coppock & Wechsler (to appear) use a logical representation language that they call Egophoric
Logic (EL). The extension of an expression of EL is relative to a model M , an assignment g, a
Kaplanian context of utterance c, and an intensional index i. The Kaplanian context c is a tuple
of the standard parameters for the speaker spc, addressee adc, time of utterance tc, and location of
utterance lc— plus an authority parameter auc:
c = ￿spc, adc, tc, lc, auc￿
The intensional index i for a sentence contains parameters for worlds wi and agents ai:
i = ￿wi, ai￿
(We will add aui and ti later.) So the extension depends on an agent a, which serves as the perspec-
tival center. This idea derives from the idea of centered worlds (Quine, 1969; Lewis, 1979a), and
has been implemented similarly for the analysis of obligatory control by Anand & Nevins (2004)
and Pearson (2012), among others, and for the analysis of evidentials by Korotkova (2016).
We define the extension of an EL expression   relative to modelM , context c, variable assign-
ment g, and intensional index i, and write it as follows: J KM,g,c,i. The centered intension of  
is a function from agent-world pairs to extensions, shown in (13a); the uncentered intension is a
function from worlds to extensions, shown in (13b).
(13) a. J KM,g,c¢ = f ∶ f(￿a,w￿) = J KM,g,c,￿a,w￿
b. J KM,g,c,a$ = f ∶ f(w) = J KM,g,c,￿a,w￿
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So the centered intension of a sentence (wrt. a given M , g and c) will be a centered worlds propo-
sition, and the ordinary/uncentered intension of a sentence (wrt. a given M , g, c and a) will be an
ordinary possible worlds proposition.
With these tools, we can define an egophor as a form that picks out the agent at perspectival
center. We designate the constant SELF as an egophor in EL. The extension of this expression with
respect to agent a is a, shown in (14a). By way of contrast, the constant for a first person indexical
is shown in (14b):
(14) a. JSELFKM,g,c,i = ai (egophor)
b. JIKM,g,c,i = spc (1st person indexical)
Using these constants, the first person pronoun jı˜: translates into EL as I:
(15) EL translation for Newari first person singular pronoun
jı˜: ￿ I
The EGO marker is a partial identity function on predicates that takes a predicate P and returns a
predicate that holds of x if P holds of x and is defined if x is SELF, the perspectival center.
(16) EL translation for Newari conjunct marker
a ￿  Pet . x .P (x) ∧ @(x = SELF)
Here @ can be read ‘partial’; it yields undefinedness when the formula in its scope is not true
(Beaver, 2001; Beaver & Krahmer, 2001). Assuming an appropriate translation for ‘drank a lot’,
and appropriate composition rules (Function Application, etc.), the translation for jı˜: a:pwa twan-a
‘I drank-EGO a lot’ will then be as follows:
(17) jı˜: a:pwa twan-a￿ DRANK-ALOT(I) ∧ @(SELF = I)
The centered intension of the formula in (17) with respect to context c is a function that picks out
the set of centered worlds ￿a,w￿ such that a = spc and a drank a lot in w. This proposition is
something that can serve as the object of an attitude de se, following Lewis (1979a).
4.3 Updating the discourse context with centered worlds propositions
We treat speech acts, including assertions and questions, as updates on discourse contexts (Lewis,
1979b; Ginzburg, 1996; Roberts, 1996; Farkas & Bruce, 2010, i.a.). In an assertion, the centered
intension of the clause corresponding to the at-issue content will be what the authority of the
context becomes committed to. If participant x is committed to a set of centered worlds P , then
for all centered worlds ￿a,w￿ in P , x publicly commits to the belief that he or she may be a in w.
But it cannot be this de se belief that the addressee acquires in communication: if Syam ex-
presses his de se attitude by saying to Mary, ‘I drank a lot’, then Mary does not come to believe
that she (Mary) drank a lot. So centered worlds propositions do not directly update the the com-
mon ground. Instead the centered proposition is uncentered with the authority, and the resulting
ordinary (uncentered) proposition enters the common ground.
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We implement this idea with a discourse model that tracks the individual commitments of the
discourse participants, namely a variant of Farkas & Bruce (2010), adapted slightly for use with
centered worlds propositions. Each participant is associated with a set of Discourse commitments,
which are sets of centered worlds. We also have a Table, following Farkas and Bruce, which is
a stack of questions under discussion (QUD’s). We assume that these questions under discus-
sion are sets of centered worlds propositions. The Common Ground on the other hand is a set of
non-centered, ordinary possible worlds. We also adopt from Farkas and Bruce a notion of a Pro-
jected Set, which is a set of projected future common grounds corresponding to different ways of
resolving the issue on the table.
Speech acts are operations that update such contexts. If   is asserted in context c, then the
centered intension of   is added to auc’s discourse commitments. The singleton set containing
the centered intension of  , {J KM,g,c¢ }, is placed on the Table. And finally, a common ground is
projected in the Projected Set which integrates the authority-uncentered intension of  , J KM,g,c,auc$ .
This is an ordinary possible worlds proposition that is obtained by saturating the perspectival center
parameter with the authority of the context. So when the proposal is accepted, the other discourse
participants need not acquire a de se attitude to the centered worlds proposition.
Let us consider some examples of assertions. In (18), repeated from (1) above, EGO-marking
indicates that the proposition expressed is centered around the subject, and since the subject is a
first person pronoun, it is centered on the speaker. So all pairs ￿a,w￿ in the centered intension are
such that a = spc. The speaker is the authority, who commits to this centered intension, and no
problems will arise when we put the authority-uncentered version in the common ground.
(18) jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a.
drink-PAST.EGO
‘I drank-EGO a lot’
In (19) the centered intension is centered around the addressee:
(19) *chã
2.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a.
drink-PAST.EGO
‘You drank-EGO a lot.’
But the authority is still the speaker, so this is problematic. The speaker probably does not want
to self-ascribe being the addressee, and furthermore, the authority-uncentered version will be a
contradictory proposition, the empty set.
The authority of the context auc is usually but not always the speaker, as Faller 2006 and Mur-
ray 2010, i.a., have emphasized in connection with evidentials, so it is not always the speaker that
becomes committed to the centered intension of  . In the case of reportative evidential marking,
we propose that the source of the information being reported be considered the authority of the
context auc. This individual, rather than the speaker, is committed to the content of the clause.
Since evidential marking is used to indicate that the authority is someone other than the speaker,
we predict that there should not be egophoric marking on the verb in the presence of evidential
marking with a first person subject.
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5 EGO-marked clauses must be authorized
In section 3 we saw that the subject of an EGO-marked verb in a complement clause is the reported
epistemic authority: in reports of declaratives, the reported speaker; in reports of interrogatives,
the reported addressee; and in reports of attitudes, the reported attitude holder. And we saw in (12)
that negated attitude verbs reject EGO-marked complements. To account for this fact, we stipulate
that EGO-clauses must be authorized: the authority in the context should believe the proposition
denoted by the clause.
To formalize the authorization requirement, we first define a doxastic accessibility relationRdox: ￿a,w￿ stands in Rdox to ￿a′, w′￿ iff it is compatible with what a believes in w for a to be a′
in w′. We will say that an agent a believes P in world w according to M iff for ￿a′, w′￿ such that￿a,w￿ Rdox￿a′, w′￿: P(￿a′, w′￿) = T.
The believes relation is used to define a new logical constant AUTHORIZED in EL:
(20) JAUTHORIZEDKM,g,c,i = f ∶ f(P) = T iff auc believes P in wi at tc according to M .
Now let us revise our EL translation for EGO:
(21) -a ￿  Pet . x .P (x) ∧ @(x = SELF ∧ AUTHORIZED(ˆ P (x)))
Whereˆ is a Montagovian ‘hat’ operator giving the centered intension: Jˆ  KM,c,g,￿w,a￿ = J KM,c,g¢
Next we will consider how authorization works in root clauses, before turning to embedded clauses
in the next section.
In a simple declarative, EGO indicates that the speaker believes herself to be the individual
denoted by the subject, and believes de se the proposition denoted by the clause. Example (1) is
repeated here:
(22) jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
‘I drank-EGO a lot’
Due to the condition of authorization imposed by the EGO marker, an utterance of (22) implies that
the speaker (qua authority) believes herself to be the speaker (qua referent of the subject jı˜: ‘I’) and
to have drunk a lot. If a second person pronoun replaces the subject of (22) but the verb remains in
EGO form, then the sentence implies that the speaker believes herself to be the addressee. Hence
such a sentence is unacceptable, as shown in (19).
When evidentials defer authority to a third party then that third person subject must authorize
the clause:
(23) syam-ã
Syam-ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
hã.
EVID
‘According to Syami, hei drank a lot.’
Here authority is conferred upon Syam. The use of the EGO form implies that the authority (Syam)
believes himself to have drunk a lot.
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We saw that in root questions with second person subjects, EGO-marking is required:
(24) chã
2.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
la?
Q
‘Did you drink-EGO a lot?’
Let us assume that the meaning of a polar question is the set containing the propositions denoted
by the prejacent and its negation (Hamblin, 1958; Karttunen, 1977).
J? KM,g,c¢ = {J KM,g,c¢ , J¬ KM,g,c¢ }
For the question to be answerable, the addressee should believe some proposition in that set. So
our new generalization is that EGO-marking on a clause denoting a set ⇡ of propositions indicates
that the authority believes some proposition in ⇡.
(25) Revised definition of AUTHORIZED:JAUTHORIZEDKM,g,c,i = f ∶ f(⇡) = T iff there is a P ∈ ⇡ such that auc believes P in wi
according to M .
The translation of EGO into EL remains the same; it is given in (21) above.
With this new definition of AUTHORIZED, the EGO marker in (24) now implies that the author-
ity for an utterance of that sentence, namely the addressee since it is a question, believes either the
prejacent or its negation. So the addressee believes either that she is the addressee (qua referent
of the subject chã ‘you’) and that she drank a lot, or that she is the addressee and that she did not
drink a lot. In other words, it implies that the addressee could answer the question sincerely.
We cannot replace the subject with a first person pronoun and keep the EGO marking:
(26) *jı˜:
1.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-EGO
la?
Q
‘Did I drink-EGO a lot?’
Here the authorization requirement means that the addressee (qua authority) believes herself to be
the speaker (qua referent of the subject pronoun). The addressee does not believe herself to be the
speaker so the sentence is out.
A rhetorical question expresses an assertion, so the speaker, not the addressee, is the authority.
As a result, EGO marking behaves as if the sentence were a declarative:
(27) Ji
I.ABS
ana
there
wan-a
go-EGO
la?
Q
‘Did I go there? (I most certainly did not!)’ (Hale, 1980, p. 100)
The EGO form means that the speaker believes herself to be the referent of the subject pronoun,
and to have either gone there or not.
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6 Analysis of egophoricity in embedded clauses
For clausal complements of speech and attitude predicates, the authority in the context shifts to the
reported authority in the attitude/speech event described in the matrix clause. Shifting is nearly
obligatory (an exception is discussed below):
(28) a. *laksmı˜:
Laksmi.ERG
jı˜:
1.ERG
gakka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
siu:.
know.IMPV
‘Laxmi knew that I worked enough.’
b. laksmı˜:
Laksmi.ERG
jı˜:
1.ERG
gakka
enough
jya
work
yat-a
do-NON.EGO
dhaka:
COMP
siu:.
know.IMPV
‘Laxmi knew that I worked enough.’
The EGO marker is not possible in (28a), despite the first person subject of that verb. While the root
authority is speaker in the utterance, hence the referent of that first person subject, the authority
has shifted to the reported authority, namely Laksmi.
Following previous accounts of the shifting of person indexicals (Anand & Nevins, 2004, i.a.)
and shifting of the epistemic authority for the interpretation of evidentials (Korotkova, 2016), we
posit that the authority and time contextual parameters auc and tc are replaced with corresponding
parameters of the intensional index. The utterance context is a tuple of parameters for the speaker,
addressee, time of utterance, location of utterance, and authority:
c = ￿spc, adc, tc, lc, auc￿
Our intensional index previously had world and perspectival agent parameters, to which we now
add parameters for the authority and time:
i = ￿wi, ai, aui, ti￿
The interpretation of most sentences of Newar will not depend upon aui or ti. But speech and
attitude reports will depend upon those parameters. The authority parameter aui is fixed to be
the reported speaker or attitude bearer, and the time ti is the time of the reported speech event or
attitude.
A special shifting operator OP is defined for EL:
(29) JOP  KM,g,c,i = J KM,g,c[au￿aui,t￿ti],i
When OP combines with a constituent  , it overwrites the authority and time parameters of the
utterance context with the authority and time values of the intensional index, for the interpretation
of  . The operator OP is a ‘monster’ in the sense of Kaplan (1977): it operates on the character of
the item in its scope, the function from contexts to contents.
This monstrous operator is encoded by the Newari complementizer dhaka, whose EL transla-
tion is given here:
(30) dhaka: ￿ OP
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The complementizer dhaka is a grammaticalized form of the verb dha- ‘to say’. As far as we know,
authority-shifted complement clauses in Newar are always marked with dhaka.
Consider first speech reports. When dhaka combines with the bracketed embedded clause in
(31), the authority for the interpretation of that bracketed clause is set to be the reported authority,
Syam; and the time is set at the time that Syam spoke:
(31) syam-ã
Syam-ERG
[wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a]
drink-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
dhal-a.
say-PERF
‘Syami said that hei drank a lot.’
The translation of (31):
(32) SAYS(SYAM,OP([ˆ DRANK-ALOT(x)∧ @(x = SELF∧AUTHORIZED(ˆ DRANK-ALOT(SYAM)))]))
The effect of AUTHORIZED is to imply that what Syam said is not just that he drank a lot, but that
he believed he drank a lot.
Negating a speech report has no effect on the EGO-marking in the complement clause:
(33) Syam-ã
Syam-ERG
wã
3.ERG
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-PST.EGO
dhaka:
COMP
ma-dha:.
NEG-say.IMPF
‘Syami didn’t say that hei drank a lot.’
Here Syam did not say that he believed himself to have drunk a lot. There is no contradiction in
(33).
However, negating an attitude verb is different:
(34) *Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
(wã)
3.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
ma-ca:.
NEG-aware.IPV
‘Rami wasn’t aware that hei￿j had done enough work.’
The effect of the AUTHORIZED condition, contributed by the EGO marker, is to imply that at
reference time, Ram believed himself to have done enough work. But (34) entails the opposite, so
the sentence is unacceptable due to a presupposition failure.
In indirect questions that are reports of direct questions, authority shifts to the reported ad-
dressee. So EGO-marking depends on whether the subject refers to the reported addressee, namely
the referent of the dative pronoun wa-yata ‘him’:
(35) Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
wa-yata
3SG.DAT
[wã:
3SG.ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka]
COMP
nyan-a.
ask-PFV
‘Ram asked himi whether hei did enough work.’
As with a direct question, let us assume that an indirect question denotes the set of propositions cor-
responding to possible answers (Karttunen, 1977). Given our revised definition of AUTHORIZED
in (25), the EGO-marking on the verb in (35) indicates that at the time of the reported asking, the
authority either believes that he did enough work, or believes that he did not do enough work.
Indirect question complements of attitude verbs are similar:
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(36) laksmı˜:
Laksmi.ERG
[su-yata
who-DAT
dheba
money
biy-a-gu
give-EGO-NMLZ
dhaka:]
COMP
siu:.
know.IMPV
‘Laxmii knows who shei gave the money to.’
The denotation of the constituent question ‘who she gave the money to’ is a set of propositions of
the form ’she gave the money to x’, where x ranges over people. The use of the EGO form implies
that the reported authority (Laxmi) believes some proposition from that set, which is completely
consistent with the meaning of (36).
However, if the attitude verb is negated, then this implication is inconsistent with the meaning,
and so EGO-marking disappears from the indirect question.
(37) *Ram-ã:
Ram-ERG
gaka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka
COMP
(wã:)
3.ERG
ma-siu:.
NEG-know.IMPV
‘Rami doesn’t know whether hei￿j did enough work.’
The use of the EGO form implies that either (i) Ram believes he did enough work or (ii) Ram
believes he did not do enough work. In other words, it implies that Ram knows whether he did
enough work. But this presupposition directly contradicts the sentence itself, so it is unacceptable.
We noted above that shifting to the reported authority is nearly obligatory, citing (28a). But
there is at least one situation in which shifting is blocked, illustrated in (38).
(38) laksmı˜:
Laksmi.ERG
jı˜:
1.ERG
gakka
enough
jya
work
yan-a
do-EGO
dhaka:
COMP
ma-siu:.
NEG-know.IMPV
‘Laxmi didn’t know that I worked enough (but I know I did).’
The sentence (38) explicitly denies that Laxmi could be the authority for the complement clause.
So there is no shifting, and EGO is licensed instead by the root authority, the speaker. An utterance
of this sentence implies that the speaker believed herself to have done enough work. Here the
context has not shifted. Note that siu:, like English ‘know’, is a factive verb in Newar. Sentence
(38) implicates that the complement clause is true, so given the maxim of quality, the speaker who
utters this sentence implies that she believes she worked enough.
7 Conclusion
Following earlier work, we have analyzed EGO morphology as marking the content of a self-
ascription. We have further postulated that EGO-marking also indicates that the epistemic authority
believes de se a proposition in the denotation of the clause; when such propositions are centered,
then the authority self-identifies as the agent at the center. For complements of speech/attitude
verbs, the authority can (and normally does, unless blocked) shift to the authority of the reported
context.
We are modeling the epistemic authority as a parameter of the utterance context, thus assimi-
lating it to the more familiar elements of the context that are picked out by indexical expressions:
speaker, addressee, time, and place of utterance. The tools developed for shifted indexicals have
been repurposed for authority shifting. But the authority differs from those other parameters in an
important respect. The authority is not a special target for reference; there are no expressions of
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Newar that directly refer to the authority. Instead the authority is a component of the discourse
pragmatic system itself: the authority is the person whose commitment to a proposition is either
being made (as in an assertion) or being questioned. So it should not surprise us that shifting, while
relatively rare and generally optional for the more familiar indexicals, is nearly obligatory for the
authority. After all, the point of embedding a sentence under a speech or attitude predicate is to
shift responsibility for it to the reported agent.
References
Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2004. Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Anand, Pranav & Andrew Nevins. 2004. Shifty operators in changing contexts. In R. B. Young
(ed.), Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory XIV, Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications.
Beaver, David. 2001. Presupposition and assertion in dynamic semantics. Stanford: CSLI Publi-
cations.
Beaver, David & Emiel Krahmer. 2001. A partial account of presupposition projection. Journal of
Logic, Language and Information 10. 147–182.
Bickel, Balthasar. 2008. Verb agreement and epistemic marking: a typological journey from
the Himalayas to the Caucasus. In Brigitte Huber, Marianne Volkart & Paul Widmer (eds.),
Chomolangma, Demawend, und Kasbek: Festschrift für Roland Bielmeier zu seinem 65. Geburt-
stag, 1–14. Andiast, Switzerland: International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies.
Coppock, Elizabeth & Stephen Wechsler. to appear. The proper treatment of egophoricity in Kath-
mandu Newari. In Minyao Huang & Kasia M. Jaszczolt (eds.), Expressing the self: Cultural
diversity and cognitive universals, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Faller, Martina. 2006. Evidentiality above and below speech acts. http:// semantic-
sarchive.net/Archive/GZiZjBhO/.
Farkas, Donka & Kim Bruce. 2010. On reacting to assertions and polar questions. Journal of
Semantics 27. 81–118.
Ginzburg, Jonathan. 1996. Interrogatives: Questions, facts, and dialogue. In Shalom Lappin (ed.),
The handbook of contemporary semantic theory, 385–422. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hale, Austin. 1980. Person markers: Finite conjunct and disjunct verb forms in Newari. Papers in
South-East Asian Linguistics 7. 95–106.
Hamblin, Charles L. 1958. Questions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36. 159–168.
Hargreaves, David. 2005. Agency and intentional action in Kathmandu Newar. Himalayan Lin-
guistics 5. 1–48.
Hargreaves, David. in press. “Am I blue?”: privileged access constraints in Kathmandu Newar.
In Simeon Floyd, Elisabeth Norcliffe & Lila San Roque (eds.), Egophoricity, Amsterdam: John
Benjamins.
Kaplan, David. 1977. Demonstratives: An essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and epis-
temology of demonstratives and other indexicals. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard
Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, 267–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Karttunen, Lauri. 1977. Syntax and semantics of questions. Linguistics and Philosophy 1. 3–44.
104
© 2018 by Stephen Wechsler and David Hargreaves
Proceedings of TripleA 4, 91-105
Edited by Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock
Korotkova, Natalia. 2016. Heterogeneity and uniformity in the evidential domain. University of
California Los Angeles dissertation.
Krifka, Manfred. 2014. Focus and contrastive topics in question and answer acts. Ms., Humboldt
University of Berlin.
Lewis, David. 1979a. Attitudes de dicto and de se. Philosophical Review 88. 513–43.
Lewis, David. 1979b. Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8. 339–
359.
McCready, Eric. 2007. Context shifting in questions and elsewhere. In E. Puig-Waldmüller (ed.),
Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 11, 433–447. Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Murray, Sarah. 2010. Evidentiality and the structure of speech acts. Rutgers University disserta-
tion.
Pearson, Hazel. 2012. The sense of self: Topics in the semantics of de se expressions. Harvard
University dissertation.
Quine, W. V. 1969. Ontolgical relativity and other essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
Roberts, Craige. 1996. Information structure in discourse: Towards an integrated formal theory of
pragmatics. In Jae-Hak Yoon & Andreas Kathol (eds.), OSU Working Papers in Linguistics 49:
Papers in semantics, Columbus: The Ohio State University.
Speas, Peggy & Carol Tenny. 2003. Configurational properties of point of view roles. In
Anna Maria DiSciullo (ed.), Asymmetry in grammar, 315–344. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Wechsler, Stephen. in press. Self-ascription in conjunct-disjunct systems. In Simeon Floyd, Elisa-
beth Norcliffe & Lila San Roque (eds.), Egophoricity, Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
105
© 2018 by Stephen Wechsler and David Hargreaves
Proceedings of TripleA 4, 91-105
Edited by Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proceedings of TripleA 4 
Fieldwork Perspectives on the  
Semantics of African, Asian and Austronesian Languages 
 
University of Gothenburg  
June 9-11, 2017 
Edited by 
Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proceedings of TripleA 4: 
Fieldwork Perspectives on the Semantics of African, Asian and Austronesian Languages 
 
Edited by Elizabeth Bogal-Allbritten and Elizabeth Coppock 
2018 Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen, Publikationssystem 
 
https://publikationen.uni-tuebingen.de/xmlui/handle/10900/78334 
 
 
All copyrights remain with the individual authors. 
Cover design by Vera Hohaus. 
 
Taro illustrations from Leo D. Whitney, F.A.I. Bowers and M. Takahashi (1939), 
“Taro Varieties in Hawaii”, Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 84, Fig. 2, pg. 15 
https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/handle/10125/4327 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
 
African 
 
Malte Zimmermann (Universität Potsdam) 
Embedded Questions and Concealed Relative Questions 
 
 
1 
Imke Driemel and Jude Nformi Awasom (Universität Leipzig) 
Focus Strategies in Limbum 
 
 
17 
Margit Bowler and John Gluckman (University of California, Los Angeles) 
Intensifying Ideophones in Three Luhywa Languages 
 
 
31 
Taofeeq Adebayo (Tulane University) 
Genericity in Event Semantics: A Look at Yoruba Generic Sentences 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
Asian 
 
Julia Braun (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen) 
Intervention Effects in Palestinian Arabic:  
How Question Formation Becomes Degraded 
 
 
 
65 
Rahul Balusu (English and Foreign Languages University, Hyderabad) 
Probing the Ignorance of Epistemic Indefinites: A (Non)-Familiarity Constraint 
 
 
79 
Stephen Wechsler (The University of Texas) and  
David Hargreaves (Western Oregon University) 
Egophoric Attitudes and Questions in Kathmandu Newar 
 
 
91 
 
 
 
 
Austronesian 
 
Vera Hohaus (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen) 
How do Degrees Enter the Grammar? 
Language Change in Samoan from [-DSP] to [+DSP] 
 
 
106 
 
